[g jones]

First of all Blair and the Labour Party were wrong to go into Iraq IMO though I thought it was not a black and white decision. The war began did it not because of Saddam's failure to comply with UN resolutions leading up to article 1441 of the UN and, although seemingly a legal war (1441 he 'had to be disarmed by force'), IMO the whole situation was massaged for a Bush-White House conclusion.

Blair has a tendency to always want his own way and I think he crossed the line to achieve this. He 'sexed up' the dossier against Saddam and that for me was the end of him as a credible Prime Minister - he stopped representing the Labour Party in order to represent the Tony Blair Party. He misled the country on the 45 minute warning particularly, and grossly overstated the threat with reckless abandon. He then mauled the BBC for slightly sexing up the case against the Government (in general & The Today programme) and IMO had an unhealthy involvement in the whole David Kelly suicide/Hutton tragedy.

It is right to question whether Bush's attitude was one of 'unfinished business' rather than a logical one. That American foreign policy was rooted in the last century reinforcing the view of the US as the bully boy of the world. Hugo Chavez said that much as recently as last month.

The arguments against the war gathered momentum and Blair tried to reclaim the moral high ground referring to the '300,000 butchered by Saddam', echoed by others. Controversially this was not the reason for war in article 1441 and as laid before Parliament. I think the lack of intervention against 'Dr Kananga' and his Zanu PF party in Zimbabwe, which was as pressing a humanitarian issue, exposed Blair's moving arguments and goal post shifting.

Links with Al Quaeda were also dragged out as reasons. There is no evidence to substantiate any connection between Al Quaeda and Saddam.

IMO the issue was about national security for the UK in a wider regional sense, Iran, Syria, the brutal Saddam junta and their political, regional and religous ambitions. Interventionists (Bush Blair) had a point in putting the brakes on Iraq becoming part of a bigger Middle East problem.

I believe discussions for war took place between the UK and US long before 1441 (Nov 2002) and Washington was 'planning the (continued) war on terror' as early as July 2002 (Invasion March 2003).

What was neglectful about Blair's stance was the relaxation of the economic embargo, the Oil for Aid programme in the 90's. Saddam's reign was ending prior to that. Weighty evidence now exists outlining the destruction of Saddam's WMD capacity through a lack of resources, funding, knowledge brought about by the embargo. Why did Hans Blick find nothing?

The OfA programme allowed The French, Chinese and Russians the opportunity to secure their own energy supplies though illicit payments to Saddam (highlighted by the UN), but it enabled Saddam to survive politically and to subsequently postulate a perceived threat to West, though his WMD development had been put back 10 years. The Oil for Aid programme was the biggest mistake. Instead of 1441, reintroduction of blanket sanctions could have removed Saddam in time.

Like Northern Ireland we were at a high risk of geting caught in a three cornered fight, fighting sectarian groups with historic prejudices looking to fill the power vacuum and who use the pools of resentment against the occupying forces to further their own ends.

Wars bring death and destruction. Every Iraqi death must have a reason or an answer. That reason or answer will usually ferment against the Coalition forces. Every family member of that fatality will add to the pool of resentment. Each death makes the war harder to win. Abu Ghraib and war attrocities, overlooked by politicians at the outset, were inevitable, but never factored in. I think the pyschological war, the so called hearts and minds campaign, was lost before it started with a policy of accepting colateral civilian deaths.

There has been an absence of any exit strategy, the question is did Bush & Blair believe in themselves so much they ignored any consideration for a problematic outcome. The only exception was Bush's reconstruction billions. Favouring US Contractors with financial connections to the White House (eg HaleBurton) Bush demonstrated there was nothing fair or ethical about his actions, even if he dressed it up legally. Plus the fact the so called reconstruction billions have now dried up. The perception that Bush played to the home crowd, right wing republican religious fanatics, patriotic loons and the US Economy decreased the chance of peace in Iraq and in a much wider sense.

Pulling out now runs the risk as the original post said of a bloodbath. If it doesn't produce a bloodbath it will certainly produce an oligarchy of corrupt, violent leaders only to willing to fill the political vacuum for their own ends.

I believe we have to stay and look at better local management. More UN troops, if anyone will commit. Especially muslim troops such as Pakistan, Saudi, Egypt and possibly the emerging Lebanesse Army (who can't fight Hizbollah). Less of a frontline presence and a reduction in combat operations in favour of civilian operations. Nationalisation of oil and gas with municipal rather than governmental receipts.

The mistake made was (and still is) to misjudge the Middle Eastern issue. A 'clash of civilisations' and the right to self determination. US democracy is good for a McDonalds at every intersection but what happens if you don't want a consumer society or believe pluralist politics is tyranny through the back door? The Middle East doesnt just want the US Government to butt out, but significant parts of the 'American Way of Life' too.